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1 Introduction
Individuals who seek insurance di¤er from each other in many respects. At
least two of these di¤erences are of central importance for insurance com-
panies and for insurance market outcomes: the distribution of losses that
insurance takers face, and their willingness to bear the risk of those losses.1
Empirically, heterogeneity in the second characteristic is not negligible. E.g.,
Aarbu and Schroyen2 nd that the degree of relative risk aversion among
Norwegians averages around 3.7 with a standard deviation of 2.1.
Insurance market theory has primarily focussed on the consequences of
private information on the loss distribution, and to a lesser extent on the case
in which information on risk aversion is private. The study of situations in
which private information applies to both characteristics is much more scant.3
Moreover, analysis of the two-dimensional private-information problem has
been restricted to competitive markets; i.e., a setting in which several insurers
compete for clients. In this paper, we study the opposite setting by asking
how a monopolist would design a contract menu intended to attract agents
who hold not only private information on their loss distribution, but also on
their risk preferences.
Our monopolistic set up encompasses (admittedly, in an extreme way)
the presence of market power in insurance markets. Several empirical stud-
ies have recently documented the presence of such market failure or of one
of its causes: signicant search and switching costs, for di¤erent lines of in-
surance. Honka4 estimates the average search cost in US car insurance to lie
between 45USD (online quote) and 110USD (o­ ine quote), and the average
switching cost at 85USD. She argues that these costs may be an important
1A third factor, that will not be discussed here, is the moral stance of insurees, deter-
mining the amount of false claims that insurers have to deal with each year.
2Aarbu and Schroyen (2014).
3Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) analyse a perfectly competitive insurance market with
private information on the distribution of losses. Stiglitz (1977, Sections 3 and 4), and
Landsberger and Meilijson (1996) analyse a monopolist insurer. Stiglitz (1977, Section
5) and Landsberger and Meilijson (1994) analyse the outcomes under monopoly when
private information is held on risk attitude. The latter paper shows that the rst best (full
extraction of consumer surplus by the insurer) can be achieved arbitrarily close through a
very non-linear contract. High risk averse agents receive their certainty equivalent wealth;
low risk averse agents get with probability almost 1 slightly more than their certainty
equivalent , but receive with a tiny probability a very negative wealth. For the more
risk averse agent, this second contract is unattractive. Hence, full insurance with almost
complete extraction of the risk premia is achieved.
4Honka (2010).
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cause for the high customer retention rates in that industry. In their study
of a rm o¤ering automobile insurance in Israel, Cohen and Einav5 argue
that the rm has market power and that a monopoly insurance model bet-
ter describes this situation than a competitive one. Also health insurance
markets show symptoms of low competitive pressure. In the Swiss health
insurance market, premia exhibit large variability even within the same can-
ton despite coverage being strictly regulated. Indeed, Lamiraud6 reports
that in the Geneva canton the di¤erence between the least expensive insur-
ance contract and the most expensive one amounted to 1,919 Swiss Francs
in 2011, a di¤erence of 39%. For the US health insurance market, Dafny7
provides evidence of direct price discrimination of insurees in local markets,
and Bates et al.8 nd evidence that health insurers do exercise their market
power to raise premia.9 While it is true that several rms may be present
in a given geographical area, this does not guarantee a competitive outcome.
Several reasons for this market failure have been put forward and shown to
be consistent with empirical observations. These include promotion expen-
ditures, rst mover advantages, exclusive control over nal service provider
networks, andas already mentionedswitching costs. These switching costs,
in turn, could be explained by choice overload (be it cognitive or psycholog-
ical), status quo bias, bundling of basic and supplemental coverage, or lack
of transferability of premium bonuses for low claims during a given period
(Lamiraud10).
Adding risk aversion heterogeneity to the analysis of insurance markets
calls for a multidimensional hidden information model. Such an analysis is
technically not straightforward because the existence of private information
in two or more dimensions implies that the ordering of agents according to
their willingness to pay for extra coverage becomes endogenous. In other
words, the ordering depends on the contract. To see this, consider two
contracts: one with very partial coverage and one with almost full coverage.
When o¤ered the former contract, a highly risk averse agent facing a low
risk may be more willing to pay for additional coverage than a risk-tolerant
agent facing a high risk, while the situation could be the other way around
5Cohen and Einav (2007).
6Lamiraud (2014).
7Dafny (2010).
8Bates et al. (2012).
9Dafny, Duggan, and Ramanryan (2012) nd that mergers leading to an increase in
market concentration were associated to a 7% increase in premia.
10Lamiraud (2014). See also Chiappori et al. (2006).
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for the latter contract. Technically, the indi¤erence curves of these inter-
mediateinsurance takers cross twice, and this invalidates standard solution
methods.11
The literature on solutions to multidimensional screening problems is not
that wide. One branch of this literature is methodological and deals with a
principalagent setting, as we do see, e.g., the users guideby Armstrong
and Rochet.12. It turns out, however, that our insurance problem does not
lend itself to being solved by the techniques proposed therein, the main
reason being that our problem has two hidden characteristics, but only one
instrument the degree of coverage.13 A second branch of literature deals
with multidimensional screening in insurance markets, but restricts itself
to competitive markets. In this literature, it is usually assumed that each
insurance company o¤ers a single contract.14 ;15 In a monopolistic setting such
as ours, such a restriction would render the analysis somewhat unrealistic,
11Jullien et al. (2007) analyse whether the single crossing property holds in the general
monopolistic screening model with moral hazard and in which agents di¤er in their risk
preferences. See also De Donder and Hindriks (2009).
12Armstrong and Rochet (1999).
13Armstrong and Rochet (1999) consider an agent with quasi-linear and separable pref-
erences over two action levels and a transfer. The principal has similar preferences but
she does not know whether the agent has a high or low valuation for either of the two
activities. A contract species a transfer and two activity levels. Thus they have a "two
instruments, two common values" problem (see also Dana (1993)). Our problem has
only one instrument, i.e., insurance coverage. The agents willingness to pay for coverage
depends on both her risk level and risk aversion. On the other hand, the insurers will-
ingness to o¤er coverage depends on the level of risk, but not on the agents risk aversion.
Risk aversion only indirectly determines contract protability through the rents that must
be left for incentive compatibility reasons. Thus our problem is of the "one instrument,
one common value"-type. This also makes our problem di¤erent from that of Armstrong
(1999) (one instrument and two common value characteristics).
14In one-dimensional screening models, competition in menus has been considered by,
e.g., Myazaki (1977) and Spence (1978) using the Wilson (1977) equilibrium concept.
15This de facto means that the main results are driven by the lack of order between
what we refer to as intermediate types; i.e., by those whose indi¤erence curves cross
twice. This explains why some only consider these intermediate types (e.g., Wambach,
2000). Although Smart (2000) and Villeneuve (2003) consider the full set of types,
they maintain the assumption that each company o¤ers a single contract per risk class.
In some models with multidimensional private information, it is possible to reduce the
dimensionality by a so-called type aggregatorsee, e.g., De Donder and Hindricks (2007)
for a political economy social insurance context. In a context closer to ours, Crocker and
Snow (2011) assume that an insurance taker may face di¤erent perils (re, theft, etc.).
Since the probability for each kind of loss is private information, the insurer must engage
in multidimensional screening. Because risk classication based on observables is assumed
su¢ ciently ne, the problem can be reduced to single dimensional private information.
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as market power allows the insurer to screen via menus without the fear of
undercutting by rivals. By assuming that the monopolist o¤ers a menu of
contracts, the relative proportions of the non-intermediate types play a role
that is as crucial as the non-single crossing of intermediate typesindi¤erence
curves. Hence, the problem of the failure of the single crossing condition
brought about by the intermediate types is compounded in the monopolistic
setting by the necessity of dealing with non-intermediate types in the design
of the optimal menu of contracts.
Our main objective is to characterize this optimal menu. We establish
three results: (i) it is always optimal to pool some of the types (i.e., full
separation of types is never optimal); (ii) unlike in the one-dimensional case,
exclusion of some high-risk individuals from insurance may be optimal; and
(iii) some low-risk individuals may end up with more coverage than some
high-risk individuals.
Next, we address two issues that recently have received much attention.
The rst one is methodological. In testing for the presence of asymmetric
information in insurance markets, the question is whether the absence of sig-
nicant positive correlation between risk and coverage (i.e., the absence of
adverse selection) should be taken as indicative of the absence of asymmetric
information. Chiappori et al.16 (CJSS henceforth) derive the testable pre-
diction that in a su¢ ciently competitive insurance market with asymmetric
information, the observable risk should be related to coverage in a positive
monotone way. Notice that this is stronger than requiring a positive corre-
lation between coverage and risk. We show when this result goes through
in our monopolistic setting, and when it does not. In the latter case, we
also show when risk and coverage can be statistically positively correlated,
and when they cannot. In this sense, our results corroborate the role of the
su¢ cient competition assumption for the result in CJSS. Our analysis also
adds the combination of market power and preference heterogeneity to the
list of possible explanations for the lack of evidence supporting the existence
of asymmetric information.17 Other explanations in the (growing) list are: (i)
endogenous heterogeneity in risks because of moral hazard (see, e.g., Cutler
et al.18); (ii) endogenous wealth heterogeneity (Netzer and Scheuer19); and
16Chiappori et al. (2006).
17CJSS propose a local argument for a negative correlation between risk and coverage
to arise in the case of monopoly. Our analysis provides instead a full characterization.
18Cutler et al. (2008).
19Netzer and Scheuer (2010).
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(iii) the insurer having privileged information on risks (Villeneuve20).
The second issue concerns the possible welfare consequences of a ban
on the use of gender discrimination in insurance. Such a ban took e¤ect
in December 2012 in the European Union, extending the principle of equal
treatment of women and men in the access to and the supply of goods and
services to the insurance industry.21 This will a¤ect the insurance sector,
because of the common practice of di¤erentiating premia according to gen-
der when underwriting life, health and car accident risks. Regarding life
insurance, it has been argued that if one controls for lifestyle, environmental
factors, and social class, the di¤erence in average life expectancy between
men and women lies between zero and two years and therefore that the
practice of insurers to use sex as a determining factor in the evaluation of risk
is based on ease of use rather than on real value as a guide to life expectancy
(Commission of the European Communities22). We show that even if as
the Commission claims gender does not provide any information on the un-
derlying risk, if it does provide (imperfect) information on an individuals
risk aversion (as empirical research suggests), then allowing the monopolist
to condition the terms of the insurance contract on gender may be Pareto
improving. We provide su¢ cient conditions for such an improvement to
arise.
From a technical point of view, we have taken a new approach to the
analysis of screening insurance takers that simplies the problem and is ap-
pealing from a modelling point of view. Rather than following the standard
set-up in which the individual faces the possibility of a single monetary loss,
we assume that the loss is normally distributed and that agents di¤er in
their expected losses, which can be high or low. If the insurance indem-
nity is linear in the loss, as is the case under a reimbursement scheme with
constant co-insurance rate, nal income will also be normally distributed.
20Villeneuve (2000).
21Council Directive 2004/113/EC of 13 December 2004 implementing the principle of
equal treatment between men and women in the access to and supply of goods and services
(O¢ cial Journal of the European Union 2004 L 373, p. 37). Originally, this directive
provided for a derogation that allowed member states to permit gender-specic di¤erences
in insurance premiums and benets in so far as gender is a determining risk factor that can
be substantiated by relevant and accurate actuarial and statistical data. In March 2011,
however, the European Court of Justice declared this derogating provision in the Directive
to be invalid on the grounds that the use of risk factors based on sex in connection with
insurance premiums and benets is incompatible with the principle of equal treatment for
men and women under European Union Law (European Court of Justice, 2011).
22Commission of the European Communities (2003), page 6.
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Endowing agents with a utility function that displays constant absolute risk
aversion, which also can be high or low, means that their preferences over
uncertain income prospects can be represented as meanvariance preferences.
An important consequence of this approach is that preferences over insurance
contracts become quasi-linear in the insurance premium and therefore in the
information rent. Readers familiar with contract theory will acknowledge
the usefulness of linearity in the information rent in specifying the incentive
compatibility constraints. An additional advantage of meanvariance pref-
erences is that they allow for an explicit characterization of the optimal menu
of contracts.
The limitations of our approach follow immediately from these assump-
tions. We do not consider insurance contracts with either a deductible or a
cap because such features would destroy the normality of net income. Sec-
ond, the normality assumption implies a positive likelihood of negative losses,
although this problem may be rendered of secondary importance by consid-
ering su¢ ciently high means and/or low variances for the losses. Perhaps
the most important objection is that we have no skewness in the loss dis-
tribution, and in particular no strictly positive probability mass for a zero
loss. Nevertheless, these are minor limitations when compared with the con-
siderable advantages the approach o¤ers for characterizing the solution to a
two-dimensional screening problem.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section,
we model the preferences of insurance takers and specify reimbursement con-
tracts. In the subsequent section, we set up the problem faced by a monop-
olistic insurer. In the section "One-dimensional screening", we characterize
the optimal menu of contracts when insurees only di¤er in risk levels or risk
aversion, as well as considering the case of perfect positive correlation. In the
section "Two-dimensional screening", we assume that insurees di¤er in both
respects simultaneously and discuss the ve menus that may be optimal. We
determine which menu is dominating for which part of the parameter space.
In the section "The positive correlation test", we interpret the testable pre-
diction of CJSS in the light of our results. In the subsequent section, we
trace out the consequences of allowing the monopolistic insurer to gender
discriminate. The nal section concludes.
Except when otherwise stated, we have relegated all proofs to a technical
companion paper that is on the Reviews website.
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2 Insurance takers and reimbursement con-
tracts
Insurance takers
We assume that individuals are endowed with initial wealth e and a nega-
tive exponential von NeumannMorgenstern utility function dened on nal
wealth y: u(y) =   exp( ry), where r > 0 is the (constant) degree of ab-
solute risk aversion. Initial wealth is subject to a random loss z that follows
a normal distribution with mean  and variance 2.
Agents have access to reimbursement insurance. A typical reimbursement
contract pays out a compensation of 1   c per Euro loss, in return for a
premium P . Ex post, nal wealth is then given by
y = e  P   cz;
which ex ante is also normally distributed. We will express a contract C as
a pair of a co-insurance rate c and a premium P : C = (c; P ).
Under the assumptions made, the certainty equivalent (CE) wealth func-
tion takes the mean-variance form: U =E(y)   r
2
var(y). By replacing the
mean and variance of nal wealth, CE wealth is given by
U = e  P   c  r
2
c22.
From now on, we write  def= r2, and assume that this product can be
either high or low, and likewise for the expected loss:  2 fL; Hg and
 2 fL; Hg,where L < H and L < H . The model can thus be inter-
preted in two ways: either individuals are equally risk averse but their losses
have di¤erent variances, or the loss variance is identical but individuals have
di¤erent degrees of risk aversion. Throughout, we adhere to the second
interpretation and will refer to  as risk aversion.
A person with characteristics (i; j) is said to be of type ij. The share
of ij individuals in the population is given by ij (i; j = H;L,
P
i;jij = 1).
We denote by k the fraction of individuals with expected loss k (k =
kL + kH); likewise, k is the fraction of individuals with risk aversion k
(k = Lk + Hk).
Incentive compatible contracts
When a person of type ij (i; j 2 fH;Lg) signs the contract C = (c; P ),
her CE wealth is
U ij(c; P )
def
= e  P   ci   1
2
c2j.
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If instead she decides to remain uninsured, her CE wealth becomes e i 12j,
which is equivalent to accepting the degenerate contract (c; P ) = (1; 0). The
CE rent that the agent enjoys from contract (c; P ) is then
Rij(c; P )
def
= U ij(c; P )  U ij(1; 0) =  P + (1  c)i + 1
2
[1  c2]j. (1)
Hence, the rent decreases with the co-insurance rate both via the expected
loss and via risk aversion (if c > 0).
The marginal willingness to pay for a slightly lower co-insurance rate c is
MWP ij(c)
def
=  dP
dc
jdU ij=0 = i + cj, (2)
which increases linearly in c.
Indi¤erence curves in the contract space (c; P ) are thus concave in c,
and downward sloping for non-negative co-insurance rates. In addition,
individuals with higher expected losses and/or greater risk aversion have a
higher marginal willingness to pay. Figure 1 illustrates the indi¤erence curve
that passes through the no-insurance point N = (1; 0). Given that the slope
of the indi¤erence curve when it passes the P -axis is , it is easy to decompose
the total willingness to pay for full insurance into the expected loss and the
risk premium =2.
Figure 1 here
When agent ij signs a contract intended for agent kl, the rent that the
former receives is given by
Rij(ckl; Pkl) =  Pkl + (1  ckl)i + 1
2
(1  c2kl)j.
It is useful to dene the following function:
(ckl; i   k; j   l) def= (1  ckl)(i   k) + 1
2
(1  c2kl)(j   l). (3)
Suppose now that type kl is truthful and receives rentRkl(ckl; Pkl). Which
rent does ij obtain when choosing the contract for kl? Using (1) and (3),
the answer is given by
Rij(ckl; Pkl)
def
= Rkl(ckl; Pkl) + (ckl; i   k; j   l).
Thus, by pretending to be type kl, type ij can obtain type kls rent plus .
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To see the usefulness of contract distortion, let us x the rent that a
truthful type kl receives under the contract (ckl; Pkl). A marginal increase
in the co-insurance rate for kl, dckl > 0, then needs to be accompanied by
a marginal decrease in the premium, dPkl = (k + ckll)dckl. This has the
following e¤ect on the rent for the mimicker ij:
@Rij(ckl; Pkl)
@ckl
jdRkl=0 =
@
@ckl
(ckl; i k; j   l) =   (i   k)  ckl(j   l).
Thus, the rent for ij goes down to the extent that ij is mimicking a type
with a lower risk or with lower risk aversion. Intuitively, when raising the
co-payment of a low risk (or risk-tolerant) individual, the decrease in the
premium needed to compensate him is not too large, because of the small
likelihood of needing that co-payment (or because of the low valuation of the
increase in the variance of nal wealth). However, a person with a higher
risk level or greater risk aversion who is tempted by this contract will dislike
this change. Thus increasing a co-insurance rate for some types will lower
the rents of all those mimicking (and the mimickers of these mimickers) who
have a higher risk, and will increase the rent of all those mimicking (and the
mimickers of these mimickers) who have lower risk aversion.
From now on, we simply write Rij for Rij(cij; Pij) (i; j = L;H). Self-
selection between contracts (cij; Pij) and (ckl; Pkl) then requires that
Rij  Rkl + (ckl; i   k; j   l);
Rkl  Rij + (cij; k   i; l   j);
which, taken together, imply 0  (ckl; i k; j l)+(cij; k i; l j),
or, using (3), Z cij
ckl
[(i   k) + c(j   l)]dc  0.
A necessary condition for incentive compatibility between contracts for
Hj and Lj (j = H;L) is thatZ cHj
cLj
dc  0() cHj  cLj; (4)
with  def= H   L > 0. Similarly, incentive compatibility between con-
tracts iH and iL (i = H;L) requires thatZ ciH
ciL
cdc  0() ciH  ciL; (5)
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with  def= H   L and where it is assumed that c  0 (on which more
below).
The double dimensionality leads in general to double crossing of the indif-
ference curves of types HL and LH. SolvingMWPHL(c) =MWPLH(c) for
c yields c = 

. That is, in the (c; P ) space, the locus of tangency points be-
tween HLs and LHs indi¤erence curves is a vertical line at 

. For lower
co-insurance rates, HLs indi¤erence curve crosses that of LH downwards
from above, while for higher rates, this happens from below. The quadratic
expressions for CE wealth ensure that if a crossing occurs at a rate c  to the
left of 

, then the second crossing occurs at c+, at the same distance to the
right of 

 see Figure 2. Hence, if we say that the indi¤erence curves of
HL and LH form a lens, then c
++c 
2
= 

is the position of this lens, while
`
def
= c+   c  is its size.23
Figure 2 here
Next, we introduce two crucial variables for characterizing the prot max-
imizing set of contracts:
D
def
=

L
2 (0;1) and x def= L
H
2 (0; 1]:
The ratio D measures, in a unit-free fashion, the di¤erence in risk between
two types.24 The ratio x measures the degree of similarity along the risk-
aversion dimension. Using this notation, the locus of tangency points is
therefore located at D x
1 x , so that for su¢ ciently small x, the tangency of
the intermediate typesindi¤erence occurs at a co-insurance rate below unity.
This makes it possible that both crossings become relevant for the analysis.
3 The insurance company
We consider a single, risk-neutral insurer with monopoly power on the market
for reimbursement contracts. Her expected prots when an agent of type ij
23We have: c+(c ) =  
r

   1
2
+ 2R
HL RLH
 . Hence, the size of the lens is
` = 2
r

   1
2
+ 2R
HL RLH
 , a dimensionless number.
24Because the coe¢ cient of absolute risk aversion (r) measures twice the risk premium
per unit of variance, we can conclude that the risk premium of a low-risk-averse type
(RPL, say) equals 12L. Therefore, D =

2RPL
= 12
=L
RPL=L
.
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has accepted a reimbursement contract (c; P ) is given by
ij(c; P ) = P   (1  c)i. (6)
Therefore, the iso-prot associated with type ij has slope  i in the contract
space (c; P ).
With full information, the monopolist will provide ij with full insurance
(cij = 0) at a premium that sets her rent equal to zero. Hence, using (1),
Pij = i +
1
2
j. This yields a per capita payo¤ equal to  = 12j. The
tangency line in Figure 1 thus corresponds to the highest feasible iso-prot
line, and the prot that the insurer makes can be read o¤ from the dashed
vertical axis on the right- hand side. Under full information, the insurer can
extract the entire risk premium =2. In what follows, we will characterize
the optimal co-insurance rates and the optimal rents. The corresponding
premia can then be found with the help of (1).
Given (6), the insurers total prot is equal to
P
i;j ij
ij(cij; Pij). From
(1) and (6) both evaluated at (cij; Pij)and recalling that we can write
Rij for Rij(cij; Pij) (i.e., type ijs rent when truthful), we can express the
insurers total prot as
P
i;j ij

1
2
[1  c2ij]j  Rij

. This objective function
is to be maximized with respect to (cij; Rij) (ij = H;L), subject to the usual
voluntary participation and incentive compatibility constraints.
As in most of the literature, to these constraints we add two additional
sets of constraints that are needed to avoid false claims (see, e.g., Picard25).
If a co-insurance rate is negative, the insurer refunds more than 100% of the
losses, and the insuree will obviously have a strong incentive to overstate the
size of the loss. On the other hand, if a co-insurance rate exceeds unity,
the agent will have to be paid to accept such a contract (i.e., a negative
premium). Once the agent has accepted the insurance, he would have to
pay the insurer as well as bearing the loss once it occurs. It is clear that he
would have strong incentives to understate the size of the loss (or even hide
the loss altogether). Hence, we constrain co-insurance rates to lie in the
interval [0; 1].
25Picard (2000).
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The monopolist thus solves the following problem:
max
fcij ;Rijg
X
i;j
ij

1
2
[1  c2ij]j  Rij

, s.t.
Rij  0 (i; j;= H;L)
Rij  Rkl + (ckl; i   k; j   l) (i; j; k; l;= H;L) (7)
0  cij  1 (i; j;= H;L)
The rst set of constraints ensures voluntary participation, while the sec-
ond ensures that all types self-select. The third set comprises the (reduced
form) ex ante and ex post moral hazard constraints.
The following theorem provides the usual result of no-distortion-at-the-
top (full insurance for the HH type) and no-rents-at-the-bottom.
Theorem 1 At the optimum,(i) cHH = 0 and (ii) RLL = 0.
Before characterizing the rest of the solution to the two-dimensional
screening problem, it is useful to rst consider the one-dimensional case.
4 One-dimensional screening
There are three instances in which screening becomes unidimensional. In the
rst instance, all agents have the same risk aversion; i.e., H = L = . This
is the standard monopoly problem with just two types when insurees either
bear a low or a high expected loss. The type distribution can be described
by a single parameter H, the proportion of high risks in the population.
We have the following theorem.
Theorem 2 When all agents have the same risk aversion, the optimal menu
has cH = 0 and cL = minfD H1 H ; 1g.
The full insurance contract giving L zero rent would be selected by H
as well. At a zero co-insurance rate, the slope of Hs indi¤erence curve is
steeper than that of L. If the insurer increases cL above zero, this will
create a second-order reduction in prot from L, but a rst-order gain in
prot from H because the latter can be charged a strictly higher premium
(for full insurance). Hence, it pays to start distorting Ls contract. The
optimal co-insurance rate balances the gain in prot from H (H ) with
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the loss in prots from L ((1   H)). Notice that it may pay to exclude
type L whenever H  1=(1 +D); i.e., whenever the proportion of low loss
agents is su¢ ciently small as expected.
The second instance in which the screening problem becomes unidimen-
sional is when individuals di¤er in risk aversion only. Let H instead be the
proportion of highly risk averse types; i.e., those with  = H(> L). We
have the following theorem.
Theorem 3 When all agents face the same expected loss, the optimal menu
has cH = 0; and cL =

0 if x > H
1 otherwise.
This result is less standard. With only di¤erences in risk aversion, the
optimal solution is always at the corner. Either the low type is excluded or
he receives full insurance. The reason for this bang-bangsolution is that,
unlike in the di¤erent risk scenario, at a zero co-insurance rate, both Hs
and Ls indi¤erence curves are tangential to one another. Hence, distorting
Ls contract by raising the co-insurance rate now results in a second-order
gain in prot from H, and it is the second-order condition that determines
whether cL = 0 is a local maximum or minimum.
The nal instance of unidimensional screening arises when risk levels and
risk aversion are perfectly positively correlated. As it transpires from (2),
we have MWPHH(c) > MWPLL(c) for any c. The two types are therefore
once again unambiguously ordered.
Theorem 4 When the two characteristics are perfectly positively correlated,
the optimal menu has cHH = 0 and cLL =
minfD HHx
x HH ;1g if x > HH
1 otherwise.
:
We now turn to the two-dimensional screening problem.
5 Two-dimensional screening
From now on, we let individuals not only di¤er in their risk levels, but also in
their risk aversion. The insurance company then faces the following bivariate
probability distribution of types:
L H
L LL LH L
H HL HH H
L H 1
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The correlation between risk () and risk aversion () is given by
corr(; ) =
E(  E)(   E)

=
HHLL   LHHLp
LH
p
LH
:
In what follows, we let  represent the numerator of the correlation expres-
sion: viz.,  def= HHLL   LHHL, and refer from now on to  as the degree
of correlation; it plays a central role in the analysis.
To parameterize the distribution of types, we use the triplet (H; HH ; ),
and have the remaining fractions determined by
HL = H   HH ; (8)
LH = HH
1  H
H
  
H
, and (9)
LL = (H   HH)1  H
H
+

H
. (10)
Non-negativity of LH and LL requires that  HL(1 H)    HH(1 
H). The feasible set of distribution parameters is then
A0 =

(H; HH ; ) 2 [0; 1]2 R j HH  H
and   (H   HH)(1  H)    HH(1  H)g :
The other parameters of the model,D and x, pertain to the characteristics
of the insurance takers. This part of the parameter space is denoted as the
types set T0:
T0 = f(D; x) 2 R+  (0; 1)g:
It turns out that D and x are su¢ cient to describe the problem we can
discard the original parameters i and j (i; j = H;L).26
In our analysis, we focus on the case in which the correlation of character-
istics is non-positive (  0). Arguably, this is the most empirically relevant
situation: highly risk averse individuals tend to take more precautions and
are thereby less likely to experience losses. Our model could be seen as a re-
duced form of a more general model in which individuals have initially taken
such precautions before going to the insurance market. The second reason for
this restriction on the sign of  is pragmatic: under negative correlation, the
typology of the equilibrium set of contracts is already complex, but mostly
26This is because (i) we can normalize L to unity, and (ii) in the monopolist problem
only  matters see (7).
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invariant to the degree of negative correlation. By contrast, with positive
correlation, the degree of correlation starts to matter for characterizing the
optimal contract menus in the parameter space. Thus, we restrict the set of
distribution parameters to
A1 = f(H; HH ; ) 2 A0 and   0g:
The monotonicity conditions (4) and (5) imply that there are only two
possible orderings of co-insurance rates:
Order 1: 0 = cHH  cHL  cLH  cLL  1;
Order 2: 0 = cHH  cLH  cHL  cLL  1:
At an optimal solution, the contracts of the di¤erent types are linked by
a chain of incentive compatibility constraints. Under Order 1, HH should
then be indi¤erent between her own contract and at least that for HL. The
next lemma (proven in the appendix) shows that HL is either pooled with
HH or with LH.
Lemma 1 Suppose Order 1 applies with cHH < cLH . Then it is optimal to
pool HL with HH if x > HH
H
; otherwise HL should be pooled with LH.
This result follows from Theorem 3. With Order 1, the only type who
may want to mimic HL is HH. Thus, the choice of cHL is only governed by
weighing the prots from these two types. Because they have the same risk
levels, we can apply Theorem 3 to this subgroup. Given that the fraction of
highly risk averse individuals in this group is HH
H
, the result follows. Thus
no menu having Order 1 will have full separation of types.
Suboptimality of full separation is also the case in Order 2. This follows
from the following lemma (proven in the appendix).
Lemma 2 Suppose that Order 2 applies. Suppose also that (i) HH is in-
di¤erent between her own contract and that for LH, but strictly dislikes that
for HL, (ii) LH is indi¤erent between her own contract and that for HL,
but strictly dislikes that for LL, and (iii) HL is indi¤erent between her own
contract and that for LL. Then, prot can be increased by pooling HL with
either LL or LH.
Before presenting our main result, we introduce the following upper bound
on the heterogeneity in risks
D
def
=
(1  H)LL
LH + (1  H)(1  LL) ;
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and in the remainder of the paper, we restrict the parameter space as
T1 = f(D; x) 2 T0 j D  Dg:
In this way, it will never turn optimal to exclude type LL and therefore any
other type under an Order 1 menu.27 We will later comment on how our
results change when risk heterogeneity is larger than D.
We now dene ve menus that may turn optimal for values in the para-
meter space T1. They are listed in Table 1, and distinguished as to whether
the degree of separation of the low-risk types, measured as cLL cLH , is larger
or smaller than the size of the lens formed by the indi¤erence curves of HL
and LH (`). Columns 4 and 5 in the table refer to the optimal coinsurance
rates and the x-range for which the menu is optimal. If a coinsurance rate is
not mentioned in column 4, it is because it is equal to zero (full insurance).
Table 1. The ve equilibrium menus.a
Menu cLL cLH Optimal coinsurance rates Range for x
(order) (if di¤erent from zero)
A (1) = 0 cALH= c
A
LL= D
H
1 H 1  LL< x  1
Bp (1) =` cBpLH= D
(1+LH+LL)x (1+LH LL)
(1 H)(1 x)
1+LH LL
1+LH+LL
< x < 1  LL
cBpLL= D
2LH+H(1 x)
(1 H)(1 x)
Bf (1) =` cBfLL= 2D
x
1 x
1 LL
1+LL
< x < 1+LH LL
1+LH+LL
C (1) > ` cCLL= D
1 LL
LL
xCE(D)
b< x <1 LL
1+LL
E (2) <` cELH= D
HHx
LH
0 < x < xCE(D)
b
cEHL= c
E
LL=

D xHL
x H (EI)
1 (EX)
a The maximal prot function for each menu is given in the appendix.
b The function xCE() is dened below in the discussion of Fig. 7.
MenuA pools the high-risk types at full insurance, and the low-risk types
at high, but partial, insurance. Figure 3 illustrates. (In this gure and those
that follow, solid/dashed indi¤erence curves refer to high/low risk aversion,
while bold/thin indi¤erence curves refer to high/low risks).
Figure 3 here
27Under Order 2, exclusion of risk tolerant types will turn optimal, even for small values
for D.
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This policy corresponds to one under which individuals di¤er only in their
risk dimensions (Theorem 2). If x  1   LL > H, which we shall argue
below is the optimal range to make use of A, the pooling of the low-risk
types happens at a lowco-insurance rate, viz., cAL < D
x
1 x(=


).
In menu B, the two low-risk types are separated by positioning them
on each side of the lens. That is, they satisfy cLH + cLL  2 Dx1 x . We
may distinguish between menu Bf and menu Bp, depending on whether LH
obtains full insurance (cLH = 0) or partial insurance (cLH > 0), respectively.
The two panels of Figure 4 illustrate.
Figure 4 here
Menu C is a menu where everybody is fully insured, except for the LL
individuals who face a very high co-insurance rate. Moreover, the screening
between LH and LL is now very thorough in the sense that cLL   cLH > `.
Consequently, cLL  2 . Menu C thus balances a high premium income
from the uppertypes with the loss in prot from severely distorting LLs
contract. Intuitively, with few LL individuals around, such distortion is
attractive. This menu is illustrated in Figure 5.
Figure 5 here
A common feature of all previous menus is that Order 1 applies (cHL 
cLH). In menu E, the opposite is true: HLs contract is now severely
distorted by being pooled with LL. This makes room for increasing the
distortion on LH, which, in turn, allows the insurer to extract more rent
from HH individuals. If there are few low risk averse individuals around, it
may pay to exclude these individuals from the market (EX), otherwise they
are included but receive limited insurance (EI). Figure 6 illustrates.
Figure 6 here
Separation of LH from LL is once more weak: cLL   cLH < `. Under
Order 1, separation of LL from LH is carried out to increase the prots from
HH, HL and LH at the cost of a lower prot from LL. Under Order 2,
HL is pooled with LL so as to extract more rent from the highly risk averse
types, HH and LH. Across these two types, rent extraction is optimized in
the standard way (cf Theorem 2).
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We now provide the main result of the paper. It refers to the distribution
space A2 which for the time being is su¢ cient to describe as almost as big
as A1. We comment on the di¤erence between A1 and A2 later.
Proposition 1 Suppose that (H; HH ; ) 2 A2. Then, the optimal menu
structure as a mapping from T1 into the menu set is as illustrated in Figure
7. For each menu, the optimal coinsurance rates are as given in Table 1.
Figure 7 here
The formal proof is in the technical companion paper that is on the Re-
views website; a sketch of the proof strategy is given in the appendix.
Here, we restrict ourselves to a heuristic explanation of Proposition 1. Sup-
pose that x equals 1 (no heterogeneity in risk aversion). Then it is optimal to
design the menu as if there were only two groupslow and high risk people
which is exactly what menu A does: the high risk types obtain full insurance
while the low risk types face a co-insurance rate as prescribed by Theorem
2. When x falls below 1, H starts to exceed L. This makes it optimal
to start screening the LL from the LH types: by providing LL with less
coverage (at a lower premium), LH (and therefore also the high-risk types
HH and HL) can be charged a higher premium. However, because LL was
initially pooled with LH at the left-hand crossing, a marginal increase in
cLL is impossible for incentive compatibility reasons (see Figure 3). What is
possible is to move LL from the left-hand crossing to the co-insurance rate
corresponding to the right-hand crossing, and adjusting her premium to keep
her rent at zero. This non-marginal reforminvolves a big loss in prot from
LL and will only be compensated by a larger prot from the uppertypes
when x < 1  LL; then, menu Bp takes over.
From the expression for cBpLH it is easy to verify that
@cBpLH
@x
> 0 and therefore
that @c
Bp
LL
@x
< 0. Thus, more heterogeneity in risk aversion (lower x) calls for
distorting LHs contract less and LLs contract more. This process goes on
until also LH is provided with full insurance (at x = 1+LH LL
1+LH+LL
). This is
where we enter menu Bf. It can be shown that the maximal prot under
menu Bf is a function of x that is inverse U-shaped, with a maximal prot
reached at x = 1 LL
1+LL
. For lower xi.e., larger risk aversion heterogeneity
this maximal prot can be secured by switching to menu C which keeps on
providing full insurance to the uppertypes but no longer insists on having
LL at the right hand crossing of the lens, as menus Bp or Bf do. The wedge
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between cLL and cLH now starts to exceed `. The maximal prot of C is
independent of x. See Figure 8 for the maximal prots as functions of x and
the appendix for their specication.
Figure 8 here
As explained earlier, a common feature of all menus of Order 1 is that HL
insurees are provided with at least as much coverage as LH insurees. At the
same time, the incentive compatibility constraints between these two types
require that the order can only be reversed by providing far less coverage to
HL than to LH. This is costly, because HL agents, despite their low risk
aversion, have a large willingness to pay for being relieved from the high risk
they face. It is when risk aversion heterogeneity gets very large, that the
benet of reversing the order outweighs this cost: although LH agents face
a low risk, their excessive risk aversion (and that of HH) endows them with
a large risk premium which the insurer wants to extract. This is when it
pays o¤ to reverse the order and substitute menu E for menu C. In the
technical companion paper that is on the Reviews website, we show that
there exists a function, xCE(H; HH ; ;D), non-increasing in D, such that
E > C () x < xCE(H; HH ; ;D).
We conclude the discussion of Proposition 1 with three remarks.
Remark 1. The transition between the menus of Order 1 is continuous
in the sense that at least one of the co-insurance rates of the lower types is
continuous in x. However, the optimal coinsurance rates show a discontinuity
in x when Order 1 is replaced by Order 2. This is illustrated in Figure
9 depicting the optimal values of cLL and cLH as a function of x. Thus
xCE(H; HH ; ;D) is found by direct comparison of the maximal prot
under menu C with the maximal prot under menu E.28
Figure 9 here
Remark 2. Because there is continuity when switching from B to C,
whereas there is discontinuity when switching from C to E, one may wonder
whether E may exceed C for any x that makes C dominate B. In other
words, does it make more sense to compare E with B? This is illustrated
in Figure 8. The prot function E intersects with C at bx < 1 LL
1+LL
, while
the function eE dominates C , indicating that once x falls short of exBE,
28It is the lower root of a quadratic equation in x.
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menu B should be replaced by menu E. In the appendix, we substantiate
the following claim:
Claim 1 The subset of distributions (H; HH ; ) in A1 for which menu C
is entirely dominated by menus B and E is almost negligible. In particular,
if    :089, there does not exists a feasible pair (H; HH) where this is
the case.
In other words, the set A2 mentioned in Proposition 1 is almost as large
as the distribution set A1.
Remark 3. So far, we have restricted the heterogeneity in risk (D) below
D. Recall that D measures the incentive for H-type individuals to mimic
L-type individuals, normalized by (twice) the risk premium of the latter. A
high co-insurance rate on L-types discourages H-types from applying for
the contracts intended for the latter, and thus allows insurers to charge the
former group more for full insurance. For D exceeding D it will turn optimal
to start excluding LL types. In the appendix, we have redrawn Figure 7
for D 2 [0; 1 H
H
].29 The only new di¤erence w.r.t. Figure 7 is that a new
menu labeledM appears as a slice in between menus A and B. This menu
excludes LL type as well, but has a degree of separation lower than that of
B and higher than that of A (0 < cMLL   cMLH < `).
This concludes the discussion of the optimal menu choice. In the next
two sections, we will discuss the implications for testing for the presence of
asymmetric information and the normative implications for banning gender
discrimination.
6 The positive correlation test
CJSS30 showed that a common prediction of any model of a competitive
insurance market with asymmetric information is a strictly positive relation-
ship between the degree of coverage and the expected loss across contracts.
This is quite a strong result, and we refer to it as positive monotonicity (PM).
This property implies a positive correlation between coverage and risk, but
the converse is of course not true.
29 1 H
H
is the largest value for D for which menu A will still o¤er coverage to the low
risk types (cf Theorem 2).
30Chiappori et al. (2006).
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In the empirical literature on testing for asymmetric information in in-
surance markets, researchers typically rely on estimating the correlation co-
e¢ cient between coverage and the expected loss, and then use a one-sided
test to determine whether this coe¢ cient is statistically signicantly positive
(see, e.g., Cohen and Siegelman31; Finkelstein and McGarry32). The empiri-
cal evidence on positive correlation is somewhat weak; there is even evidence
of negative correlation in some markets.33 This is quite surprising, because
the result of CJSS is general; conditional on the competition assumption, it
holds for any combination of moral hazard and adverse selection in underly-
ing risk.34
As mentioned in the introduction, several theoretical explanations for this
lack of evidence have been proposed. One is the so-called cherry picking ar-
gument(Chiappori and Salanié35) or propitious selection(Hemenway36),
which combines adverse selection in risk preference (but not in the underlying
risk) with moral hazard. The argument is that if individual A is more risk
averse than B, then A is willing to purchase more coverage than B. But be-
ing more risk averse, A may ex post take more precautions than B. This may
then result in a negative correlation between observed risk and coverage.37
Because the optimal menu in a monopoly market with two-dimensional
screening may display Order 2, PM will cease to hold; for a subset of types
31Cohen and Siegelman (2010).
32Finkelstein and McGarry (2006).
33The later phenomenon is termed advantageous or propitious selection. In regard to
life insurance, see, e.g., Cawley and Philipson (1999) and McCarthy and Mitchell (2003),
and in long-term care, see, e.g., Finkelstein and McGarry (2006). Olivella and Vera (2013)
show that in duplicate private health insurance systems (in which the public and the
competitive private insurance sectors o¤er the same portfolio of services), if heterogeneity
is in risks only then propitious selection into private insurance should be observed if and
only if information on risks is symmetric.
34Moral hazard can encompass two distinct phenomena. One relates to better covered
individuals having less of an incentive to undertake precautionary behaviour, which makes
them observationally more risky. The other arises because one does not necessarily observe
actual risk but the usage of, say, health services. Because coverage implies a lower cost
of accessing these services, individuals may use more of these services because they have
more coverage, not because they are more risky. Notice that both types of moral hazard
reinforce the positive correlation. Of course, one of the econometric issues is that, even
after observing some positive correlation, it is hard to disentangle the adverse selection
and either of the two moral hazard e¤ects.
35Chiappori and Salanié (2000).
36Hemenway (1990).
37See, e.g., Jullien et al. (2007), De Donder and Hindriks (2009), and Finkelstein and
McGarry (2006).
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(LH and HL), coverage is negatively related to risk size. This of course
does not imply that the correlation between risk and coverage is negative,
because PM does hold for other subsets of types (between HH on the one
hand and LH and LL on the other). This also suggests that a su¢ ciently
negative correlation between risk and risk aversion (i.e., a su¢ ciently negative
) ensures a negative correlation between coverage and risk size. This is
shown below.
Also CJSS point out that the PM property may be violated in a monopoly.
They do this by starting with a model in which only preference heterogene-
ity exists (cf. Section "One-dimensional insurance"), and then introduce an
innitesimal amount of exogenous risk heterogeneity that is perfectly nega-
tively correlated with risk aversion heterogeneity (i.e., the more risk averse
agents have a slightly smaller accident probability). Below, we show that the
PM property does not hold whenever menu E applies, even if the underlying
risk and risk preference are independently distributed.
Translated into our setting, the CJSS proposition may be stated as fol-
lows:
Consider two contracts Ca and Cb that are o¤ered on the market. Sup-
pose that: (i) Ca gives more coverage then Cb, i.e., ca < cb; and (ii) the
per capita prot generated by contract a does not exceed that of contract b,
(Ca)  (Cb). Then, (iii) the expected loss to those consumers signing up
for contract a should exceed the expected loss of those consumers signing up
for contract b, i.e., (Ca)  (Cb).
It is easy to see that property (iii) is satised in all menus except for
menu E. In that menu, the contract for LH has more coverage than the
contract for the low risk averse individuals (LL and HL). The PM property
would then require that (CLH) = L > (CL) =

HL
L
H +
LL
L
L

, which
is obviously violated. The culprit is the violation of condition (ii): CELH
generates a higher per capita prot than does CEL. Indeed,
(CEL) =
HL
L

1
2
[1  (cEL)2]L   (1  cEL)

+
LL
L
1
2
[1  (cEL)2]L
=
1
2
[1  (cEL)2]L  
HL
L
(1  cEL);
(CELH) =
1
2
[1  (cELH)2]H  
1
2
[1  (cELH)2]
=
1
2
[1  (cELH)2]L.
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Because cELH < c
E
L, it follows that (CLH) > (CL), irrespective of which
optimal values the co-insurance rates take under menu E.
Performing a positive correlation test on our model would amount to
calculating the covariance across contracts between 1  c(C) and (C):
cov(1  c(Cij); (Cij)) =
X
i;j
ij(1  cij)i  
X
i;j
ij(1  cij)
X
i;j
iji: (11)
As the second part of the following proposition shows, when the optimal
menu is EI, this covariance is negative if and only if the correlation between
expected loss and risk aversion, , is su¢ ciently negative.
Proposition 2 (i) For a su¢ cient degree of heterogeneity in risk aversion,
such that menu E prevails, some low-risk individuals (LH) purchase more
coverage than do some high-risk individuals (HL). (ii) In the case of menu
EI, cov(1  c(Cij); (Cij)) < 0 if and only if  <  HH

x  HH
H

(< 0).
In other words, the advantageous selection among LH and HL, described
by part (i), may exactly o¤set the standard adverse selection, such that any
correlation between risk and coverage vanishes. Finkelstein and McGarry38
show that the long-term care insurance market may su¤er from asymmetric
information, despite the absence of evidence for a positive correlation between
risk and coverage. Our model helps in interpreting this evidence.
7 Gender discrimination
Crocker and Snow39 have shown that imperfect categorical discrimination
in insurance such as gender discrimination always expands the e¢ ciency
frontier. Hoy40 showed how categorization based on a signal may lead to
a Pareto improvement in a competitive insurance market if the signal con-
veys information about the level of risk. In this section, we ask when such
e¢ ciency gains arise in a monopolistic market structure. We show that a
Pareto improvement is possible if the signal, such as gender, is informative
about risk aversion.
Let us write p(; ; g) as the likelihood function that an arbitrary insuree
has an expected loss of , risk aversion of  and gender g 2 fm;wg. A
38Finkelstein and McGarry (2006).
39Crocker and Snow (1986).
40Hoy (1982).
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monopolist who is allowed to condition on gender will, for each gender, g,
design an optimal contract menu based on the risk-aversion ratio, x, the risk
di¤erence parameter, D, and the probability matrix,41
p(L; Ljg) p(L; H jg)
p(H ; Ljg) p(H ; H jg)

:
We now assume that risk aversion is a su¢ cient statistic for gender with
respect to the expected loss:
Condition S p(j; g) = p(j).
Condition S means that within a given risk-aversion class, the observation
of a persons gender carries no extra information about the risk class to which
this person belongs.42 In general, su¢ ciency is not enough to break the link
between gender and expected loss. If female drivers are highly risk averse,
and if this attitude leads them to careful driving, then there will still be
a connection between gender and expected loss. This last connection is
broken by the assumption that expected loss is independently distributed of
risk aversion i.e., risk aversion has no impact on driving. This allows us to
state the following result.
Lemma 3 If the likelihood function p() satises Condition S and if  and 
are independently distributed, then  and g are also independently distributed:
p(jg) = p().
Thus, these assumptions support the conclusion reached by the European
Commission that gender is insignicant in explaining risk type.
Because a gender-discriminating rm will use the probability functions
p(; jg) (g = m;w), rather than the single function p(; ), to design menus,
and because prots and consumer rents depend on the co-insurance rate cLL,
it is important to determine the e¤ect of p() on cLL. From proposition 1, it
follows that without discrimination, the upper boundaries of menus C, Bf,
and Bp are determined by the parameters LL and LH . Fixing x and L
(and therefore H = 1   L) allows one to trace out the optimal value of
41We assume that the support of the distribution of types does not vary with the signal.
Alternatively, the support could be made dependent on the signal. This, in e¤ect, amounts
to assuming that the support consists of more than four (; )-pairs, some of which have
zero probability mass, depending on the observation of the signal.
42Two equivalent formulations of Condition S are: p(gj; ) = p(gj) and p(; jg) =
p(j)  p(jg).
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cLL as a function of LL.43 This yields Figure 10, in which it is assumed
that 1 x
1+x
< 1
2
(1 + L)(1   x). This means that the curve for LLs optimal
co-insurance rate is at for some range of LL values; this is equivalent to
assuming that
1  L
1 + L
< x: (12)
This condition is satised when the proportion of low-risk individuals, L,
is not too small in relation to x.
Figure 10 here
There is ample evidence that men are on average less risk averse than
women.44 For our model, this means that p(Ljw) < p(L) < p(Ljm). An
insurance company that is allowed to gender discriminate, having observed
the customers gender g, will update the probability LL in the following
way:
LLjm
def
= p(L; Ljm) = p(LjL)  p(Ljm) = p(L)  p(Ljm) (> LL); and
LLjw
def
= p(L; Ljw) = p(LjL)  p(Ljw) = p(L)  p(Ljw) (< LL):
where the rst equality sign follows from Condition S and the second follows
from independence. Thus, while L and H do not change when gender is
observed, LL does.
Suppose now that (12) holds, and suppose that the proportion of LL
individuals as a whole, among men, and among women, are LL; LLjm, and
LLjw, respectively. Suppose also that these proportions are as illustrated in
Figure 11.
Figure 11 here
Then, we can conclude that because
1  x
1 + x
< LLjw < LL <
1
2
(1 + L)(1  x); (13)
the co-insurance rate for LL women will remain at its no-discrimination value,
and the rents of LH women, HL women, and HH women will not change
43By Lemma 3, the marginal probability distribution of the risk size (L; H) is xed.
44See Hartog et al. (2002), Cohen and Einav (2007), Eckel and Grossman (2008),
Kimball et al. (2008) and Aarbu and Schroyen (2013).
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because of discrimination (and LL women continue to receive zero rent). On
the other hand, because
1  x
1 + x
< LL <
1
2
(1 + L)(1  x) < LLjm; (14)
the optimal co-insurance rate for LLmen will drop below its no-discrimination
value, and therefore, all men will receive more rent when o¤ered the opti-
mal contract menu for men (except LL men, who continue to receive zero
rent).45 The insurance company will increase its total prots because it
prefers to choose a new menu for its male clientele it could have stuck to
the same menu as in the no-discrimination case. Thus, a Pareto improve-
ment is possible by allowing gender discrimination. As can be seen from
the gure, conditions (13) and (14) are not only su¢ cient for a Pareto im-
provement, but also necessary. We summarize this result in the following
proposition.
Proposition 3 Suppose that Condition S holds, and that  and  are inde-
pendently distributed. Suppose that (12) holds. For given values of x; L,
and D, allowing gender discrimination will lead to a Pareto improvement in
the insurance market if and only if conditions (13) and (14) hold.
Intuitively, because men are on average less risk averse, the malemarket
consists of more LL types than does the overall market. This makes the
distortion of the LL contract that was optimal for the entire market too
costly for the male market: o¤ering LL men a lower co-insurance rate
(in return for a higher premium) increases prots from this market segment
su¢ ciently to compensate for the lower rents extracted from the "higher"
male types. Hence, all men benet, and so does the monopolist.
It is worth mentioning that a similar result can be derived in the case
where risk averse and risk tolerant agents all face the same expected loss.46
Then the optimal menu has cH = 0, while cL = 1 if and only if x  H
(or L  1   x) (cf Theorem 3). In other words, all types receive full
insurancewhich implies that risk averse agents receive a rentexcept if risk
tolerant individuals are su¢ ciently few in number. In this latter case, risk
tolerant agents are excluded and the risk averse ones receive no rent. Hence,
45Because the optimal menu for men is of the type Bp, the rents are given as follows:
RHH = RHL +
1
2;RHL = RLL + (1   cLL), RLH = RLL+ 12 (1   c2LL), and
RLL = 0. Since cLL falls under discrimination, Rij (ij 6= LL) rises.
46We thank the Editor, Achim Wambach, for pointing this out to us.
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if one starts from a situation with few risk tolerant agents (and where no
agent obtains any rents), gender discrimination may create a malemarket
with su¢ ciently many risk tolerant agents so that these no longer become
excluded. This in turn raises the rents of risk averse men in that market.
The femalemarket is not a¤ected since gender discrimination leads to an
even lower percentage of risk tolerant women, reinforcing the optimality of
their exclusion. This result can be illustrated using a gure analogous to
Figure 11, now with L is in the horizontal axis and cL in the vertical axis.
The curve depicting cL is at at 1 to the left of point 1  x and jumps down
to zero to the right of 1  x. Starting from an overall proportion L to the
right of 1 x, gender discrimination may result in Ljw < 1 x < Ljm, and
thus in a Pareto improvement.
8 Conclusion
In this paper, we studied the outcome in a monopolistic insurance market
when the insurer is only aware of the statistical distribution of the expected
loss and the level of risk aversion of its customers. We formulated a mean
variance model that results in quasi-linear preferences over contracts; we
identied the ve contract menus that emerge in equilibrium; and for each
menu, we derived the optimal co-insurance rates. Next, we identied for each
menu the subset of parameter values for which that menu is optimal. We
did this under non-positive correlation between the two characteristics.
We found that
 it is never optimal to fully separate all the types. In other words, there
will always be some pooling of types in equilibrium;
 the greater is the heterogeneity in the expected loss, the more it pays
to screen the low-risk from the high-risk types, by imposing a high
co-insurance rate on the former;
 the greater is the heterogeneity in terms of risk aversion, the more
it pays to screen the low risk averse from the highly risk averse by
imposing a high co-insurance rate on the former; and
 the property of positive monotonicity between coverage and expected
loss need no longer hold neither does the property of positive corre-
lation.
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We also identied an open set of parameter values such that when the fe-
male distribution of risk aversion rst order stochastically dominates the male
distribution, allowing gender discrimination results in a Pareto improvement
in this market. Hence, our analysis shows that one should be careful when
abolishing gender categorization; even when gender itself does not (statisti-
cally) a¤ect the expected level of losses or claims, it may a¤ect the outcome
in an imperfectly competitive insurance market so that nobody gains and
some participants become worse o¤.
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Appendix
The approach to prove Proposition 1
At an abstract level, for any (H; HH ; ;D; x) 2 A1  T1, the problem
is:
max
m2M(D;x)
F (m;H; HH ; ;D; x); (15)
where m is a contract menu (CHH ; CHL; CLH ; CLL) and M() is the set
of feasible menus satisfying the self-selection and participation constraints.
Problem (15) is complex both due to the number of inequality constraints
that dene the feasible set, and because this set is beset by non-convexities.
To identify the solution for each (H; HH ; ;D; x) 2 A1  T1, we proceed
as follows.
First, we delineate the set of incentive compatible menus as much as
possible by deriving a list of properties that any optimal incentive compatible
menu should satisfy. This allows us to restrict the feasible set to a reduced
setM() M(), such that
arg max
m2M()
F (m; ) = arg max
m2M()
F (m; ):
Second, we identify three subsetsMi() M() (i = 1; 2; 3), with [iMi()
=M() but not necessarily with empty intersections. This allows us to dene
solutions to three sub-problems: mi() = argmaxm2Mi F (m; ) (i = 1; 2; 3).
Because the three subsets unite toM(), it follows that
arg max
m2M()
F (m; ) = arg max
m2fm1();m2();m3()g
F (m; ):
Third, we solve each of the three sub-problems. Finally, we perform a
comparison to distinguish the global solution from the local ones. For this
comparison, we rely on the following revealed preference principle:
If mi() 2Mj() (j 6= i); then F (mi; )  F (mj; ):
Two of the three subproblems belong to Order 1. The third belongs
to Order 2. To identify the partitioning of T1 where Order 2 takes over
from Order 1, a direct comparison of the maximal value functions will turn
necessary.
Proof of Lemma 1
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The proof goes by contradiction. I.e., suppose that Order 1 applies and
that the optimal menu has cHH < cHL < cLH . We adopt the following
notation: ij ! (9)kl means that ij gets as much (more) rent out of her own
contract than out of the contract for kl.
1. From Lemma 8 in the technical companion paper that is on the
Reviews website, we know that at an optimal solution either HH ! HL
or HH ! LH or both. If "both", Corollary 1 in that paper tells that
cHL = cLH , contradicting the assumption. If HH ! LH and HH 9 HL,
then RHH = RLH+(cLH ;; 0) > RHL+(cHL; 0;). Since RHL  RLH+
(cLH ;; ), it follows thatRLH+(cLH ;; 0) > RLH+(cLH ;; )+
(cHL; 0;), or cHL > cLH contradicting the assumption. Hence, the only
possibility that is left is HH ! HL and HH 9 LH.
2a. Suppose that LH ! HL. Then RLH = RHL + (cHL; ;)
and RHL  RLH + (cLH ;; ) imply that either cLH = cHL or that
cHL < cLH  2   cHL. The rst possibility is ruled out by assumption.
The second possibility means that cLH is between cHL and the right hand
crossing of the lens. See the Figure 12.
Figure 12 here
2b. Recall from step 1 that HH 9 LH. Suppose now that LL! LH.
Then RLL = RLH + (cLH ; 0; ). But this means that by reducing cLH
down to the left hand crossing of the lens, LLs rent when mimicking LH
is reduced (@RLH+(cLH ;0; )
@( cLH) < 0). Thus reducing cLH to the left hand
crossing of the lens is feasible without upsetting LLs incentive compatibility
constraint. Hence, if LH ! HL then we must have that at an optimal
solution the contracts for HL and LH are located at the left hand crossing
of the lens, contradicting that cHL < cLH . Therefore, LH 9 HL.
3. If cHL < cLH , then LL 9 HL. Suppose on the contrary that
LL ! HL. Then RLL = RHL + (cHL; ; 0): But self-selection of LL
requires RLL  RLH + (cLH ; 0; ). Therefore RHL + (cHL; ; 0) 
RLH+(cLH ; 0; ). However, self-selection of LH requires RLH  RHL+
(cHL; ;). Combining both inequalities gives (cHL; ; 0) 
(cLH ; 0; ) + (cHL; ;) or cHL  cLH . Since cHL < cLH by
assumption, we have a contradiction.
Summing up so far: only HH is tempted by the contract for HL.
4. By increasing cHL, only the rent ofHH will be a¤ected (lowered). The
rents of LH and LL are una¤ected. Hence, the motivation for increasing
cHH is based on balancing the reduction of HHs rent with the increase in
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the distortion of HLs contract. It follows then from Theorem 3 that it is
either optimal to set cHL equal to cHH (when x > HHH ) or to increase cHL as
much as possible. Since we argued in step 2a that the upper bound is the
left hand crossing where LH is located, it follows that when x < HH
H
, it is
optimal to set cHL = cLH . 
Proof of Lemma 2
The proof goes by contradiction. Suppose that full separation under
Order 2 is optimal. This situation is depicted in Figure 13.
Figure 13 here
First note that cLL must exceed


= D x
1 x because, otherwise, LH and
HL could not have been separated.
The prots from the di¤erent types are as follows:
HH =
1
2
(1  c2HH)H   (1  cLH)+ (1  cHL) 
1
2
(1  c2HL)   (1  cLL);
HL =
1
2
(1  c2HL)L   (1  cLL);
LH =
1
2
(1  c2LH)H + (1  cHL) 
1
2
(1  c2HL)   (1  cLL);
LL =
1
2
(1  c2LL)L:
Weighting with the respective population proportions gives the following rst
derivatives with respect to the co-insurance rates.
@tot
@cHH
=  HHcHHH ; @tot
@cLH
= HH  LHHcLH ;
@tot
@cHL
=  H+ HcHL   HLcHLL;
@tot
@cLL
= (1  LL)  LLcLLL:
The solution for cLL is cLL = minfD 1 LLLL ; 1g. A necessary condition that
cLL > D
x
1 x is x < 1  LL. Only if cLL > D x1 x is there room to separate
LH from HL. Because
@tot
@cHL
=  H+ [H(1  x)  HLx]HcHL;
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total prot is strictly concave in cHL if and only if x  H1 LL . In that case,
the optimal solution for cHL is cHL = minfD HxH(1 x) HLx ; 1g.
By monotonicity, the only possibility for full separation arises when cHL =
D Hx
H(1 x) HLx < 1. It remains then to check whether cHL < cLL. Suppose
rst that cLL = D 1 LLLL < 1. Then,
cHL < cLL () x < H(1  LL)
HLL + (1  LL)2 :
Because H(1 LL)
HLL+(1 LL)2 <
H
1 LL , this condition contradicts the assump-
tion that x  H
1 LL . Suppose next that cLL = 1. Then,
cHL < cLL () x < H
1  LL +DH :
Again, this contradicts the assumption that x  H
1 LL . Hence, cHL = cLL,
meaning that HL is pooled with LL.
On the other hand, if total prot is strictly convex in cHL, it pays to
move cHL either down to cLH or up to cLL. Hence, full separation is never
optimal. 
The maximal prot functions for each menu
For menus A, Bp and Bf, the prots from the four types are as follows
HH =
1
2
H   1
2
[1  c2HL] +
1
2
[1  c2LH ]   (1  cLH) 
1
2
[1  c2LL];
HL =
1
2
[1  c2HL]L +
1
2
[1  c2LH ]   (1  cLH) 
1
2
[1  c2LL];
LH =
1
2
[1  c2LH ]H  
1
2
[1  c2LL];
LL =
1
2
[1  c2LL]L;
and total prot is
tot =
1
2
L   H + HcLH+ 1
2
(1  LL)c2LL +
1
2
(HH   HLL)c2HL
  1
2
(LHH + H )c2LH  
1
2
LLc
2
LLL:
For menu A, upon substitution for the optimal coinsurance rates, the
maximal prot function becomes
Atot = L

1
2
  HD + 1
2
D2
2H
1  H

:
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Using the optimal coinsurance rates for menu Bp gives
Bptot = L

1
2
  HD + 1
2
D2
2H
1  H + 2D
2LH(1  LL   x)
(1  x)2(1  H)

;
while using the optimal coinsurance rates for menu Bf gives
Bftot = L

1
2
  HD + 2D2x(1  LL   x)
(1  x)2

:
In the case of menu C, the prots from the four types are
HH =
1
2
vH   1
2
   (1  cLL);
HL =
1
2
L   (1  cLL);
LH =
1
2
H   1
2
 +  (1  cLL);
LL =
1
2
[1  c2LL]L;
and total prot is
tot =
1
2
L   H + (1  LL)cLL  1
2
LLc
2
LLL:
Replacing cLL with the optimal coinsurance rate for menu C gives
Ctot = L

1
2
  HD + 1
2
D2
(1  LL)2
LL

:
Finally, the prots under menu E are given by
HH =
1
2
H   (1  cLH)  1
2
(1  c2L);
HL =
1
2
[1  c2L]L   (1  cL);
LH =
1
2
[1  c2LH ]H  
1
2
[1  c2L];
LL =
1
2
[1  c2L]L:
Hence, total prot is
tot =
1
2
L   H + (HHcLH + HLcL)  LH 1
2
c2LHH
+
1
2
(HH + LH   x)c2LH :
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Inserting the optimal coinsurance rates for this menu gives
Etot = L

1
2
  HD + 1
2
D2x

2HH
LH
+
2HL
x  H

:
Proofof Claim 1
For each value of  ( 0), we can dene a region R() in the (H; HH)
space such that the prot function for menu E is depicted by eE rather than
E in Figure 8:47
R() = f(H; HH) 2 [0; 1]2 : xCE(H; HH ; ;D)jsmall D  1  LL(H; HH ; )
1 + LL(H; HH ; )
g
Bundles in this region can be shown to be feasible.48 Figure 14ac displays
R() for  = 0;  1
30
;  2
30
. Thus, if  =   2
30
, then for almost all (H; HH)
that are feasible in combination with this value for  (the area delineated by
the dashed line), it transpires that the interval for which menu C is optimal,
[xCE(H; HH ; ;D);minf1 LL(H;HH ;)1+LL(H;HH ;) ; 11+2Dg], is non-empty. For   :089, almost allcan be replaced by any.
Figure 14a, 14b, 14c here
We therefore restrict the set of distribution parameters further to
A2 = f(H; HH ; ) 2 A1 and (H; HH) =2 R()g:
However, from the previous discussion, A2 is almost as large as A1.
The extension of Proposition 1 when D 2 [0; 1 H
H
]
First note that 1 H
H
is the maximal value for D such that the low risk
types LL and LH are pooled at a coinsurance rate below 1 under menu A.
Second, if D is large, then under menu A, the right hand crossing will
happen at a coinsurance rate exceeding 1 and at a negative premium. To
establish separation of LL from LH, LL can be excluded, while the premia
for LH and the high risk types are increased with an amount to make LH
indi¤erent between having insurance at the original coinsurance rate cL and
being uninsured. This increase in premia is 1
2
(1   c2L)H , yielding a prot
increase of (1   LL)12(1   c2L)H . The loss in prot by excluding the LL
47Since xCE(H; HH ; ;D) is decreasing in D it is su¢ cient to consider
xCE(H; HH ; ;D)jsmall D.
48That is, if (H; HH) 2 R() for some   0, then (H; HH ; ) 2 A1.
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types is LL 12(1  c2L)L. The gain exceeds the loss whenever x < 1  LL.
The new menu we end up with is menuM. It gives full insurance to HH, a
small but positive co-insurance rate for LH, but exclusion of LL. Type HL
is pooled with HH if x > HH
H
; otherwise, this type is pooled with LH (cf
Lemma 1). Figure 15 (drawn for x > HH
H
) illustrates this menu.
Figure 15 here
The optimal values for the co-insurance rates underM are given by
cMLL = 1; c
M
LH =

D Hx
H(1 x)+LHx if x >
HH
H
;
D Hx
HL+LH
if x  HH
H
;
cMHH = 0; and c
M
HL =

0 if x > HH
H
;
D Hx
HL+LH
if x  HH
H
:
Thus, the di¤erence between A and M is that the low-risk types (LH
and LL), are now separated from one another, but the degree of separation
is small, in the sense that cLL   cLH < `, the size of the lens.
Figure 7 of Proposition 1 can now be extended as in Figure 16. In
this gure, the postscripts I and X are attached to menus Bp and C to
distinguish whether type LL is included (cLL < 1) or excluded (cLL = 1).
As shown in Lemma 1, whether HL is pooled with HH or with LH depends
on whether x exceeds or falls short of HH
H
. A su¢ cient condition for HL
being pooled with HH in menusM and BpX is
HH
H
<
1
1 + 21 H
H
=
H
2  H :
Figure 16 is drawn for on H = :6; HH = :2 and  = 0. Hence, this
su¢ ciency condition is satised, and all (D; x) combinations in the regions
for BpX andM have pooling of HL with HH rather than with LH.
Figure 16 here
Proof of proposition 2, part (ii)
Under menu EI, cEHH = 0; c
C
LH = D
xHH
LH
and cEL = D
xHL
x H , with x >
H = LH + HH . (see Table 1, rowEI). Using the denition of LH (eq
(9)), the inequality condition on x is equivalent to x > HH
H
  
H
. Therefore,
+ H

x  HH
H

> 0: (16)
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In addition,   0 is necessary and su¢ cient for HH
H
 H . Thus x > H
and   0 imply
x >
HH
H
: (17)
Substituting the expressions for the optimal co-insurance rates in the
covariance formula (11) and making use of the formulae for HL, LH and
LL (8)-(10), allows us to write the covariance between coverage and risk as
cov =
+ HH

x  HH
H

+ H

x  HH
H
 2H()2 xL .
Given (17), all the terms in the round brackets in the above expression
are positive. From (16), the denominator is positive. Therefore,
cov < 0()  <  HH

x  HH
H

:

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Figure 1.  An indifference curve and an iso-profit line in the (c,P)-space 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.  The indifference curves of HL and LH cross twice 
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Figure 3.  Regime A 
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Figure 4a.  Regime BpI          Figure 4b.  Regime Bf 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.  Regime C 
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Figure 6.  Regime EI. 
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Figure 7.  Optimal regimes in the (D,x)-space. xCE(∙) is explained in the text.   
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Figure 8.  Maximal profit for the different menus, as a function of x.  When 
profits of Regime E are given by 𝜋�𝐸 , Regime C is entirely dominated by 
Regime E. 
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Figure 9.  Optimal coinsurance rates for LH and LL as a function of x 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10.  The optimal coinsurance rate for LL as a function of αLL   
0        xCE                         x 
   cLL 
   cLH 
         1 
 cLL 
 cLH 
cLH   
 EX| EI |     C       |     Bf    |         Bp            |        A 
cLL 
0             1 αLL 
   C            Bf                Bp                A 
46 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11.  A priori and updated probability of type LL and corresponding coinsurance rates   
 
 
 
 
Figure 12.  An incentive compatible order 1 menu with cHL<cLH and where LH is indifferent 
between her own contract and that for HL, must have HL’s contract at the left crossing and 
𝑐𝐻𝐿 < 𝑐𝐿𝐻 ≤ 2Δ𝜇Δ𝜈−𝑐𝐻𝐿.    
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Figure 13.  A full-separation menu under Order 2 
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Figure 14.  For (αH⋅,αHH)-values inside the solid line area, Regime C ceases to occur when ρ 
equals 0 (a), -.0333 (b), -.0666 (c).  The dashed line area gives all combinations of (αH⋅,αHH) 
such that for the selected ρ the triplet (αH⋅,αHH, ρ) belongs to Ao.  
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Figure 15. Menu M 
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Figure 16.  Optimal regimes in the extended (D,x)-space.  
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